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Test or enhance your legal knowledge with authoritative (and sometimes amusing) questions and hypotheticals drawn from our seminars and publications. Scroll down and click on topics of interest!

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September 22, 2026
A “time is of the essence” term is not an implied term in a real estate contract under Virginia law. If time is to be of the essence in a contract, a careful drafter will include the term “time is of the essence,” as well as additional language making it absolutely clear that the clause is included because it is intended to be part of the consideration for the mutual benefit of the contracting parties and because the inclusion of the clause is an important part of the inducement for the execution of the contract.

Most REALTORS® do not recommend that a “time is of the essence” clause be inserted in a residential sales contract, and many lawyers would give the same advice to their clients.

The insertion of such a clause may excuse performance of a contract as a result of a minor default that causes no harm to the other party. The buyer or seller could opt out simply because of remorse or because a better offer has been made or received. Insertion of such a clause could permit the termination of a contract in situations where one party would enjoy a financial gain that became available after the contract was signed. Where a “time is of the essence” clause is present, the attorney for either party should alert his or her client to the clause and its meaning.

 

September 8, 2026
In Garofalo v. Di Vincenzo, Record No. 250094 (Va. Feb. 26, 2026), a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Virginia defined the standard for “evident partiality” as a ground for vacating an arbitration award under the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act, Code of Virginia §8.01-581.010(2). 

That particular question had not appeared before the Virginia Supreme Court before—the court has now held that “a party seeking vacatur for evident partiality must objectively demonstrate that a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would conclude that the arbitrator’s conduct signifies obvious bias against that party.” 

Upon conclusion of the arbitration, Garofalo sought to vacate the award based on “evident partiality” by an attorney arbitrator, claiming that some connections between that attorney and Di Vincenzo were not disclosed as required.

The Court used both the Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary to conduct a plain-meaning analysis of the standard:

…“evident,” means “clear to the vision or understanding…” synonymous with “manifest, patent, distinct, obvious, [and] apparent.”  Evident, Webster’s Ninth New College Dictionary 430 (1983)… [it] denotes more than a conceivable or nebulous appearance of bias—it means an appearance that a person would recognize in a conclusive way. 
 
…“partiality” (or “partial”), means “inclined to favor one party more than the other.”  Partial, Webster’s Ninth New College Dictionary 858 (1983)… If disinterest is the norm for arbitrators, partiality would describe a deviation from that expectation.  (some citations omitted)

The resulting standard?

“A party seeking vacatur for evident partiality must objectively demonstrate that a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would conclude that the arbitrator’s conduct signifies obvious bias against that party,” met through “objective evidence of conduct inconsistent with impartiality—not necessarily proof of the arbitrator’s actual subjective bias, nor a presumption of bias from every party-arbitrator interaction.” 

The Court emphasized that the very nature of arbitration, with its “many forms…  and… varied relationships…—whether industry-specific or between arbitrators, parties, and their attorneys,” resists rigid, bright lined standards and formulaic approaches. 

Applied to the facts in this case, that standard could not be met—the attorney arbitrator’s prior contacts with Di Vincenzo were far too remote, attenuated, and immaterial. Neither their prior business interactions nor the contractual and financial relationship between companies rose to the level of objective evidence leading a reasonable person to find obvious bias against Garofalo. 

 

August 11, 2026
Artificial intelligence (AI) is likely to be the top headline of 2026. That hot topic has been nearly unavoidable in business, sports, entertainment, social media … and maybe in legal circles. When it comes to adoption of AI technology, there are many open ethical questions for lawyers to consider, and those might leave you wondering:

Can’t my firm really just do without?

Maybe not. According to Karim Lakhani of the Harvard Business School and author of Competing in the Age of AI: Strategy and Leadership When Algorithms and Networks Run the World, “AI won’t replace humans — but humans with AI will replace humans without AI.” This quote, which originally appeared in the Harvard Business Review on August 4, 2023, set the tone for Tom Dunlap’s recent overview of the state of AI in a VirginiaCLE seminar.
 
Here are just some of the highlights, drawn from a variety of published surveys and reports:
  • 79% of legal professionals are using AI, in line with other industries, and 82% plan to increase that use within a year.
  • Predictably, AI adoption does trend toward younger generations. More surprising perhaps is that firms of all sizes are relatively equally likely to adopt it.
  • More than half of firms have not yet addressed the issue of AI with a written policy.
June 30, 2026
In our last Did You Know, we explored the meaning of en banc review. Today, we tackle an age-old question, not of how many judges it would take to screw in a light bulb (we wouldn’t dare!), but rather how many it takes to review a decision.

Traditionally, the term en banc has been used to refer to circumstances in which the entire body reviewing a previous decision (be that an appellate court or a regulatory board) hears the matter as one. This is opposed to review by a single adjudicator or a panel of several.

The distinction is important—bringing the full weight of the reviewing authority to a challenged decision can enhance the legitimacy of the outcome, ensure its quality and consistency, and signal collective ownership of the result by the deciding body.

It might surprise you then to learn that sometimes, “everybody” doesn’t really mean everybody. Most notably, beginning in September, the VirginiaCourt of Appeals will not require all members to sit when en banc thanks to statutory changes to the size and function of that body. HB 443, signed into law by the governor in April, expanded the bench from 17 to 21 judges, and allows the court to sit en banc with just 13 judges on a randomized rotational schedule.

Referred to as a “limited en banc court,” this arrangement has become a popular way to address staffing and case load issues in many jurisdictions. Under federal law (28 U.S.C. § 46(c)), any U.S. Court of Appeals with more than 15 active judges is legally authorized to perform its en banc function using this set up. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 29 active seats but regularly sits en banc with just 11 judges present. Similar setups appear in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits as well as the Florida District Courts of Appeal, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Trade Commission. 

 

June 30, 2026
A court may sit with all members present en banc (literally, “from the bench”) for review of a decision previously made by a smaller panel of the same.

Example

Interested parties in the federal contracting process, such as unsuccessful bidders, may formally protest the terms of a government solicitation or the award of a contract. These protests can be filed directly with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Federal Claims), or if first unsuccessfully filed with the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), refiled with Federal Claims as an “effective appeal.” Obviously, there is not time for en banc review of every protest: in 2025 alone, GAO received 1,688 protests (including cost claims and requests for reconsideration).

Procedure and standard of review

Instead, these claims are first heard by a three-judge panel of Federal Claims and only reviewed by the court en banc if that merits panel has failed to follow existing US Supreme Court or federal circuit decisions precedent or the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance. Petitions for mere panel rehearing are reviewed by the three judges that issued the opinion; petitions for rehearing en banc are reviewed by all eligible judges of the court. 

 

June 16, 2026

Hypothetical

Buck Nichols represents Sawyer, who was previously employed as an IT analyst with TS Consulting LLC. While employed, Sawyer raised questions about whether TS Consulting was properly paying for software licenses that it was installing on its clients’ computers. Sawyer also had problems with attendance and tardiness, and after several warnings, his employment was terminated. 

Buck brings a claim on behalf of Sawyer, asserting that Sawyer was fired in violation of the Virginia Whistleblower Protection Law. During discovery, Buck is served with interrogatories by the defense counsel, including a standard interrogatory about Sawyer’s damages. In response to what earnings Sawyer has had since his termination from TS Consulting, Sawyer answers that he’s not been able to find other work and has had no income for the last seven months. Buck has Sawyer sign the Interrogatory Answers under oath and serves them on the defense counsel. 

Just prior to the parties beginning depositions, they decide to mediate the case. The morning of the mediation, after Buck and Sawyer have met with the mediator privately and told their story, Sawyer looks at Buck and says, “If I tell you something, you can’t tell anyone, right? I mean you’re my lawyer and this is all covered by the privilege, right?” Buck assures him of the solemnity of the attorney-client privilege, whereupon Sawyer tells him: “You know how I said I haven’t been working for the last seven months? Well, that’s not exactly true. My cousin runs his own IT shop, and he’s been paying me about $7000 a month as a consultant to help him with his business. But don’t tell the other side or the mediator. Let’s see if we can get this settled today without them finding out.” 

Buck now knows that the sworn interrogatory answers that he served in the case were not truthful and that he will have to amend them if the case doesn’t settle. 

Questions and Answers 

Is it ethically permissible for Buck to move forward with getting the case settled that day without apprising his opposing counsel of the false information in interrogatory answers? 

No. As reflected in LEO 1477, Buck cannot move forward with the mediation without informing opposing counsel of his need to correct the Answers to Interrogatories. A settlement entered into in reliance on sworn, yet incorrect, answers would be fraudulently induced, whether the attorney verbally reaffirms the incorrect answers or simply remains silent as to their inaccuracy during the mediation process. 

What if a settlement in principle has been reached during the mediation, and the parties have signed a term sheet which explicitly states it will be turned into a settlement agreement when Sawyer makes his disclosure to you?  

The fact that a settlement had been reached in principle would not make any difference in this situation. Buck’s duty to the tribunal, as well as to his opponent, mandates that he correct the sworn answers prior to finalizing the settlement – even if such disclosure might blow up the settlement.

What if the term sheet was turned into a settlement agreement, signed by all parties, the settlement funds paid, and a dismissal with prejudice filed with the court when Sawyer makes his disclosure to Buck? 

This becomes a more difficult situation, as Buck was not aware of the false statement by his client until after the settlement had been completely consummated in the case dismissed and no longer pending before the tribunal. Arguably, Buck’s duty to the tribunal and to his opponent on that particular matter has ceased.

What if, instead of including this information in sworn interrogatory answers, Buck had merely stated in his initial demand letter to the employer (based on information that Sawyer gave him) that his client has been unable to find any work for the last seven months?  

As the parties are not in court, Rule 3.3 would not seem applicable yet. But Buck still must grapple with Rule 4.1 and Rule 8.4. As a matter of professional ethics, as well as personal integrity, when Buck finds out that the information that his client had provided him for the demand letter was not accurate, it is incumbent upon Buck to inform his opponent. 

 

April 7, 2026
Virginia Code § 20-79(b) provides: “In any suit for divorce, the court in which the suit is instituted or pending, when either party to the proceedings so requests, shall provide in its decree for the maintenance, support, care or custody of the child or children in accordance with Chapter 6.1 (§ 20-124.1 et seq.), support and maintenance for the spouse, if the same be sought, and counsel fees and other costs, if in the judgment of the court any or all of the foregoing should be so decreed.” 
 
With this authority, the question turns to:

What factors may affect “the judgment of the court” that fees should be decreed?

Whether to award fees and in what amount are matters of discretion vested in the trial court. An award of attorney’s fees is a matter submitted to the trial court’s sound discretion and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Ingram v. Ingram, 217 Va. 27, 29, 225 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1976). 
 
Virginia Code §§ 20-79(b) and 20-99(6) provide the statutory basis for the broad discretionary authority circuit courts have to award attorney’s fees and other costs as the equities of a divorce case and its ancillary proceedings may require.
 
The Virginia Court of Appeals has stated, “This discretionary authority also extends to related post-divorce proceedings.” Tyszcenko v. Donatelli, 53 Va. App. 209, 222, 670 S.E.2d 49, 56 (2008).
 
Significantly, however, there is no prevailing-party entitlement to fees under Code §§ 20-79(b) and [former] 20-99(5). The appellate court went on to say, “Instead, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, may award attorney’s fees and costs to ‘either party as equity and justice may require.’” Id. (quoting Virginia Code § 20-99(6)). Therefore, after considering “the circumstances of the parties” and “the equities of the entire case,” a trial court may exercise its discretion and issue an award of attorney’s fees and costs that is reasonable “under all of the circumstances revealed by the record.” 

So, what kinds of factors do matter? 

Although as noted, there is no “prevailing party entitlement,” as a practical matter, prevailing does matter, as do the comparative incomes and assets of the parties, the reasonableness of fees, and the reasons that incurring fees became necessary, among other things. 
 
When possible, therefore, bifurcate claims for awards of fees from the remaining issues. Bifurcation so that the fee argument is offered only after the outcome is known permits the court to learn which party was unrealistic or unfair in settlement efforts, which can in turn affect the decision of whether to award fees, or how much to award.
March 10, 2026
The Court of Appeals of Virginia released an opinion in September 2025 (Williams v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 718 (2025)) clarifying the difference between the probative/prejudicial test in Rule 2:403(a) (the general rule) and Rule 2:404(b) (evidence of prior bad acts).

Rule 2:403(a) provides that relevant evidence is admissible unless the probative value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Although Rule 2:404(b) also requires the trial court to balance the probative value of the evidence against its potential prejudice, it does not use the “substantially outweighs” standard from Rule 2:403(a). Instead, Rule 2:404(b) permits the introduction of otherwise admissible prior-bad-act evidence only “if the legitimate probative value of such proof outweighs its incidental prejudice.” The difference in balancing tests makes it easier for a party to introduce relevant evidence generally than to introduce relevant prior-bad-act evidence. Prior-bad-act evidence that is otherwise admissible must be excluded whenever its probative value is merely outweighed by its incidental prejudice; the prejudice need not substantially outweigh the probative value.

 

February 24, 2026
In Amazon Logistics, Inc. v. Va. Emp. Comm’n, 304 Va. 107 (2025), the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that: “A litigant cannot ‘approbate and reprobate by taking successive positions in the course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually contradictory,’ or else such arguments are waived.” Rowe v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 495, 502 (2009). Litigants cannot “‘blow[ ] hot and cold’ depending on their perceived self-interests.” Babcock & Wilcox v. Areva, 292 Va. 165, 204 (2016). They must “elect a particular position” and are thereafter confined “to the position that [they] first adopted.” Matthews v. Matthews, 277 Va. 522, 528 (2009).
 
As the Court stated in the first paragraph of its decision:

“Put more colloquially, Amazon [the appellant] now ‘zigs’ when it previously ‘zagged.’ This stratagem, therefore, fails—as it must.”

Amazon had sought a class-wide ruling from the Virginia Employment Commission that all Amazon Flex drivers were independent contractors. After the Commission instead found all Flex drivers were employees, Amazon appealed and argued the record was insufficient to support a class-wide ruling. The Supreme Court held that Amazon waived its arguments through inadequate briefing under Rule 5:27 and by approbating and reprobating its position.
 
Amazon’s “brief assigns error on one ground, but then fails to specifically argue those grounds in the body of the brief,” which constitutes waiver “as an inadequately developed argument supporting an assignment of error (colloquially called a bad-brief waiver) in violation of Rule 5:27(d).” Amazon Logistics, Inc., at 111-12. “[W]hen the argument on brief, even if carefully crafted and legally persuasive, nonetheless has little, if anything, to do with the assignment of error,” the waiver “applies.” Id. at 112. Amazon could not “approbate and reprobate by taking successive positions in the course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually contradictory.” Id. at 114-15 (internal citation omitted). Amazon “clearly asked for a ruling concerning all Flex drivers. Amazon’s new assertion that it only sought a decision limited to one Flex driver, rather than Flex drivers as a class, is a prime example of a litigant approbating and reprobating its position; the arguments are therefore waived.” Id. at 116.
February 3, 2026
We’ll explore some examples below. Please note: When discussing legal-specific AI requests, it is assumed you are using specialized forms of AI for the legal industry and not a generic AI such as ChatGPT. This is to eliminate the chance of hallucinations, that is, instances where the models generate incorrect, misleading, or nonsensical information.

Legal Research and Analysis

AI systems can search through vast legal databases in seconds, identifying relevant precedents, statutes, and regulations far faster than traditional methods. We’ve moved from manual book research, to Boolean search electronic research (“accident w/25 fallen tree”), to natural language electronic search, to now AI.
 
AI allows you to input entire hypotheticals or pleadings and request an analysis. The seasoned practitioner is able to jump immediately to the relevant materials and even new attorneys save time by not spending hours chasing down the wrong rabbit hole, instead focusing their attention to the proper area of law to then read the source materials that were produced.

Document Generation and Review

From contracts to pleadings, AI can draft, review, and analyze documents with increasing sophistication. Some of the available tools allow you to compare a contract with your gold standard for overall analysis and specific provisions/terms (or revised drafts to verify changes). You can also describe your position and intent to AI and ask it draft a contract for that need:
e.g. – “You are a landlord of a mid-sized shopping center in VirginiaBeach. Using Virginia law, draft a commercial lease favorable to the landlord with the following terms [list]. The tenant is a dance studio and has the following requests we want to accommodate [list].”
This prompt (which is very basic and could be better) will produce a lease for you to then review and finalize.

Due Dilligence

AI is particularly good at quickly and accurately reviewing large amounts of data. One of the best uses of AI is to review, sort, and analyze information. It can sort through thousands of pages of medical records to create a summary or give a chronology with references. It can comb through years of text messages to identify certain words or even sentiments. Imagine what AI could have done for large-scale document review for cases such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill litigation, which produced over 8 million pages of documents that had to be reviewed.

Predictive Analysis

AI can analyze case outcomes and help predict litigation risks based on historical data patterns and large amounts of data. With AI’s ability to review large amounts of data, you could feed it every published decision by a court or judge, ask it to take the persona of the court/judge, and then have a dialogue with the AI about your pleading or arguments to see how that court/judge will likely respond. You can likewise give it jury awards in a jurisdiction with the case facts and other relevant data to query how your particular case may fare (for strategy and also venue selection).

Deposition Assistance

In addition to document review and assisting with preparing questions and outlines for depositions, you could use AI live at depositions to analyze transcripts in real time, automatically separating important responses, and even flagging relevant documents and exhibits based on the responses. It can even note pauses, unusual body language, and discomfort during live depositions (as AI can analyze video, images, and sound as well as documents).

Jury Selection

AI can supercharge the research of potential jurors, dramatically simplifying what used to be a manual process (or an expensive third-party hire) to investigate your venire. You can ask AI to research all potential jurors from the pool based on the information you receive and what’s on the internet and in public records. You can then better identify patterns, possible biases, and potential juror attitudes that might impact your case.
 

…or how AI can enhance
the business side of your law firm?

Intake/Client Acquisition

AI can supplement or possibly replace parts of your intake/client acquisition systems. It never sleeps, gets sick, or deviates from your consistent standard. There are text-based AI tools (chatbots) that can interact with website visitors to answer questions, screen to see if a lead is qualified (geographic area, practice area, etc.), and even gather information for someone to call them back. This allows 24/7 interaction without having to pay for 24/7 staff.

There are even AI systems that can answer and make telephone calls. The AI voice sounds human and can walk you through a conversation (chances are likely that you’ve interacted with an AI on a call and don’t know it). Youset up parameters and even accent/tone/empathy level for the AI. Yourecord all calls and while the AI learns on its own, you can give feedback on a particular interaction for future improvements.

Marketing

AI excels at creative tasks such as copywriting, both generation and iteration. It proofs, adjusts based on desired audience, and helps with creativity. AI’s multi-modal ability (varied forms of media) is always improving. ChatGPT’s latest image-generation tool that was released on March 25, 2025 (with the most recent overall model, ChatGPT 5.2, released in December 2025), was a vast improvement over the last iteration, removing hiccups like too many fingers (it previously didn’t do hands well) and wonky text. It is startling how well it does. The same productivity can be had with video and audio. It is easier than ever to produce content. Graphic tools such as Adobe and Canva all have AI baked into them now.

HR/Administration

AI can assist with the day-to-day running of your firm. As an example, we were hiring a new marketing manager for my firm in late 2024. We created a custom GPT (a saved query based on specific prompts/inputted data) to review finalists and produce an hour-long interview. We fed it the job ad, additional information on what was being sought, and then, when ran, it asked for the cover letter and resume of the applicant. With this data, it produced a set of interview questions based on this data. Finalists were given paid projects to evaluate their skills/experience. Another GPT was made with similar information and asked to create a project that should take three hours with specific items to see what was produced by the candidates. In both instances, what was produced in seconds gave at least 80% of what was needed, saving tremendous amounts of time and often giving a few things not thought of independently.
 
It can also help with employee manuals, training materials, and basically any other routine task you have done manually up until now.

Billing

Time tracking is the bane of many attorneys. Hourly billing has been long criticized as encouraging inefficiency, and AI may finally be the catalyst to cause a shift in the long-standing tradition. For now, while it still lives, AI can greatly assist with capturing lost time, which is rampant. With AI-assisted tools, your computer usage can be monitored and the AI summarizes what was done for the various time periods and can even learn which cases that work may involve (by email addresses, names of files/subject, websites visited, etc.).
 
It can even enter the billing entries into your practice management system if it has open API. This not only speeds up the process, but captures time often lost due to failure to note.
 
January 27, 2026

No.

Improper driving is simply where a defendant is charged with reckless driving, and the judge finds that the defendant’s culpability is “slight” (Va. Code § 46.2-869). The distinction is critical; reckless driving is a Class 1 misdemeanor, whereas improper driving is a mere traffic infraction punishable by a fine of up to $500.

A police officer, however, cannot charge improper driving at the time a traffic stop is made; instead, improper driving is a type of discretionary reduction of a reckless driving charge.

The authority to reduce a reckless driving charge to improper driving lies with the jury or the trial judge during trial, or with the prosecutor prior to the court’s decision (Chibikom v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 422, 680 S.E.2d 295 (2009)). This discretion is based on a finding that the driver’s level of culpability is slight. Importantly, improper driving is not a lesser-included offense of reckless driving, meaning it does not automatically apply as a step-down charge; it must be affirmatively determined by the finder of fact or offered by the prosecution before a verdict is reached.

December 16, 2025

Beginning July 1, 2026, Virginia has established an Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) Program as a penalty for certain speed-related offenses, including reckless driving or drivers exceeding 100 mph and for accumulating demerit points. See Code section 46.2-507 for details about the ISA Program.
 
The ISA Program requires convicted drivers to install and pay for an ISA system, which limits their vehicle’s speed to the posted limit, serving as an alternative to license suspension in certain cases.
 
Like ASAP, the defendant can pre-enroll in this program before adjudication of their case.

 

December 9, 2025

What’s a conversion clause in a fee agreement?

This was the topic of LEO 1899 (2023) and a 2025 disciplinary proceeding.

Questions presented in LEO 1899

When a lawyer represents a client on a flat (or fixed) fee agreement, can the agreement provide for an alternative fee arrangement if the representation is prematurely terminated by the client without cause?
 
What, if any, limitations apply to such an alternative arrangement?

The Answer

A lawyer’s fee agreement with a client may include an alternative fee arrangement or “conversion clause” if the client terminates the representation prematurely and without cause. However, an alternative fee or conversion provision must be reasonable and adequately explained to the client.
 
A crucial component of a lawyer’s ability to use a conversion clause is the duty to adequately explain a fee arrangement to the client under Rule 1.5(b). It must be clear as to whether it establishes an alternative hourly fee arrangement or establishes an hourly rate to be used in a quantum meruit calculation; the latter option would be impermissible, even if clearly stated, because the lawyer’s usual hourly rate is not the only factor applied in a quantum meruit analysis. Similarly, in a flat fee context, a conversion clause should not attempt to state what the appropriate quantum meruit analysis is, but rather make clear that the clause creates an alternative fee arrangement based on an hourly or other metric as opposed to the flat fee.
 
Another option, rather than applying an hourly rate in the event of termination, would be to use benchmarks in the agreement providing that portions of the flat fee can be earned at various points in the representation and then use those benchmarks as the basis for a conversion clause. Again, pursuant to Rule 1.5(a) and (b), the amount earned at each benchmark must be reasonable considering the amount of work to be done in the case, and the arrangement must be adequately explained to the client.

November 18, 2025

No.

The case of Johnson v. Ng, Case 1:2024-cv-277(RDA-LRV) (U.S. Dist. Ct., EDVA, August 28, 2024),  illustrates the federal courts’ deference to state courts in matters of probate and estate administration, even when the case might otherwise fall within federal jurisdiction.

Defendant Kathy Ng initially served as the executrix of an estate valued at over $1 million. Plaintiffs, including Johnson, filed a proceeding in a Virginia trial court seeking Ng’s removal as executrix and requesting awards of specific interests in the estate. As state court proceedings began to turn unfavorable for Ng, she attempted to remove the case to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction based on her Washington, D.C. residency versus the plaintiffs’ Virginia residency, and the estate’s substantial value. Federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction when: (1) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; and (2) there is complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants.

In response, the plaintiffs filed a motion in federal court to remand the case back to state court. The federal court agreed, citing the longstanding “probate exception” to federal jurisdiction. This doctrine limits federal courts’ authority over probate matters, including disputes about estate administration and determinations of beneficiaries. The court referenced Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006), which held that the probate exception bars federal courts from adjudicating matters involving the probate or annulment of a will, the administration of an estate, or disputes over property under state probate court control.

Although Ng’s arguments for removal raised procedural questions about the mechanics and timeliness of removal, these issues were rendered moot because the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the probate exception. The case serves as a clear reminder that estate disputes—even those involving significant monetary value and diverse parties—typically fall within the exclusive domain of state courts.
November 11, 2025

In 2016, Harris, driving an Enterprise rental car, struck Joplin on his motorcycle. Enterprise sought to settle by offering the policy limit, $25,000, in exchange for a release of claims against both it and Harris. Enterprise never heard back from Joplin. Joplin subsequently sued Harris in 2018 for $300,000.
 
It turned out that Joplin had signed and notarized the release, but it was only discovered by his lawyer in 2020, and it was so faded that it was illegible. Joplin claimed the release had only been intended to settle with Enterprise, not Harris personally. Harris, in turn, raised a plea of accord and satisfaction, arguing the signed release barred the suit against her as well. To prove the contents of the faded release, she introduced an unsigned but legible version of the same form, along with testimony from Enterprise’s claims adjuster, who confirmed it matched the document Joplin had returned.
 
The circuit court admitted the unsigned release and ruled for Harris. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the unsigned release to be inadmissible parol evidence. The Supreme Court, in Harris v. Joplin, __ Va. __, 916 S.E.2d 80 (2025), reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, finding that it didnot abuse its discretion. The Court held that the parol evidence rule did not bar the admission of the unsigned release because the unsigned copy was not being used to change or contradict terms but simply to verify an illegible document. (It noted that the more fitting objection would have been under the best evidence rule, which Joplin did not raise.) The Court also clarified that Harris only needed to prove the connection between the two documents by a preponderance of the evidence. Given the adjuster’s testimony and supporting records, there was a sufficient basis to conclude that the signed and unsigned releases were the same. Accordingly, the release barred Joplin’s negligence claim, and final judgment was entered for Harris.

 

November 4, 2025

Hypothetical

You have an active court-appointed practice and you sometimes take cases from non-profit organizations because you want to give back to the community. Your niche is providing short-term limited scope representation, such as a bond motion or arraignment.
 
Lately, though, those clients are rather vocal in telling you that you have to keep representing them because “the court said so,” and threatening to file a bar complaint if you back out. It’s awkward but more importantly, you are considering coming off the court-appointed list.

Is there any relief in sight?

Answer

Rule 6.5 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which governs non-profit and court-annexed limited legal services programs, was amended by order of the Virginia Supreme Court on May 16, 2025 (effective July 15, 2025) to address this situation.
 
The introductory paragraph of Rule 6.5(a), with new text shown in bold italics, now reads as follows:
 
“A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, including a court-appointed short-term limited scope representation, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without the lawyer being retained or appointed to continue representation in the matter:”
 
As always, this is subject to conflict of interest or disqualification Rules.
 
The comments in the petition to amend the rule state: “Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services — such as advice or the completion of legal forms — that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as court-appointed representation at first appearance, legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer’s representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.”
October 28, 2025

Hypothetical

Mother seeks to introduce testimony from a daycare teacher that her 4-year-old Johnny said, “Daddy hit Mommy last night.” Father objects on hearsay grounds.

Is the child’s statement really hearsay?

Analysis

In family law cases, the Best Interests of the Child standard does not override evidence rules. It may be in the child’s best interest for everyone to hear what was said, but if there is not an applicable hearsay exception, the statement is not admissible.

“Not all out-of-court communications are hearsay. First, the rule only reaches ‘statements.’ The Virginia Rules of Evidence define a statement for purposes of the hearsay rule as an oral or written assertion. Va. Sup. Ct. R. 2:801(a). In other words, if the declarant states something that cannot be proven true or untrue, i.e. does not make an assertion, then the trier of fact is not asked to make a credibility determination and the purpose of the hearsay rule is not served by exclusion.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 500, 503 (2021).

“If the words are offered for their truth, the statements should properly be classified as hearsay, and only then must the court consider if the statements fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. If the statements are not offered for their truth, based on the context and other evidence in the case, including the actual use by the proponent at trial, then the statements are admissible unless they run afoul of some other evidentiary rule.” Id. Traditional hearsay analysis applies if the child’s out-of-court statement is offered for truth but there are potential exceptions:
  • Present sense impression (Rule 2:803(1))
  • Excited utterance (Rule 2:803(2))
  • State of mind (Rule 2:803(3))

Preservation Point

The proponent must proffer both the specific statement made by the child and the circumstances surrounding it.

 

October 13, 2025

Analysis

Several states have adopted specific prohibitions on lawyers using certain words when describing themselves in marketing materials. In several states, lawyers are specifically prohibited from from calling themselves experts.

  • In re Velahos, Docket No. DRB 15-409, at 3 (N.J. Disciplinary Review Bd. Mar 23, 2016) (suspending for six months a lawyer for various ethics violations; “[I]n his websites, respondent stated that he was a ‘renowned expert in Interest Liable [sic] and Slander.’ In fact, the Supreme Court has never certified respondent in any practice area and respondent’s area of practice was limited to mortgage modifications.”; the suspension was ordered by 137 A.3d 500 (N.J. 2016)).
     
  • Fla. Bar v. Doane, 43 So. 3d 640, 640 (Fla. 2010) (enjoining respondent lawyer from “the use of the term ‘Expert’ or ‘Experts’ in all legal advertisements and any trade name.”).
     
  • In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, PRB Dkt. No. 2002.093, 868 A.2d 709, 710, 712 (Vt. 2005) (privately admonishing a lawyer who used the term “‘INJURY EXPERTS'” and “‘WE ARE THE EXPERTS IN [certain areas of law]'” in yellow page advertisements; finding that use of the term “experts” violated the Vermont ethics rules “by placing an advertisement that implicitly compared his firm’s services with those provided by other lawyers in a way that can not be ‘factually substantiated.’ The panel noted that the phrase ‘the experts’ was ‘an implicit statement of superiority’ as compared with other firms, and had a ‘serious potential to mislead the consumer, since there is no objective way to verify the claim.'”; pointing to an Ohio case prohibiting lawyers from using the phrase “”passionate and aggressive advocate'”).
     
  • Ohio LEO 2005-6 (8/8/05) (holding that Ohio lawyers may not engage in a television station’s “Ask the Expert” television program; finding that the term “expert” as applying to a lawyer was improper; allowing lawyers to participate in the program if the word “expert” was removed).
At least one state has specifically prohibited lawyers from using the word “authority” when describing themselves. South Carolina Rule 7.4(b) (advertisements “shall not contain any form of the words ‘certified,’ ‘specialist,’ ‘expert,’ or ‘authority'”).
 
Other states permit lawyers to use words like “expert” and “expertise” if the claims can be “factually substantiated.” Virginia LEO 1750 (revised 12/18/08).

So, may an attorney claim to be an expert?

Best Answer

The best answer to this hypothetical is maybe.
October 7, 2025
There is a growing demand for amicus briefs in Virginia appeals. A “friend of the court”—or amicus curiae—is a non-party who offers additional insight or perspective on a pending case. Dating back to Roman law when the “friend of the court” served a role akin to today’s law clerk, the role of an amicus was to serve as a neutral and objective authority who could assist the judge in deciding cases. Over time, this neutral “friend” morphed into one of support for the litigants. By the time the 20th century rolled around, an amicus almost entirely advocated for a particular party and position.

Virginia’s rules on amicus briefing honor amicus roles. Virginia Supreme Court Rules 5A:23 (Court of Appeals) and 5:30 (Supreme Court) govern amicus briefing. These rules outline the basics of timing (within seven days of the party you support), leave of court (it depends), and what stage of proceedings they can be filed (all).

Because of the increasing amount of appeals, there has been a corresponding growth in amicus briefs—typically from industry or non-profit groups who want to weigh-in on an appellate decision that will affect their field. As a result, the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Court of Appeals of Virginia have been tightening some of the requirements on amicus briefs.

Rules 5A:23 and 5:30 now states that an amicus brief must “comply with the rules applicable to the brief or filing of the party supported”—be it the Opening or Appellee Brief. “If a person or entity is filing an amicus brief in support of neither party, the brief amicus curiae must comply with the rules applicable to the appellant or petitioner.” Rule 5:30 requires that an amicus brief must also include a statement that indicates whether:
 
  1. a party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or in part;
  2. a party or a party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and
  3. a person—other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel— contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief and, if so, that identifies each such person.
September 30, 2025
Hypothetical
You have an active court-appointed practice and you sometimes take cases from non-profit organizations because you want to give back to the community. Your niche is providing short-term limited scope representation, such as a bond motion or arraignment.
 
Lately, though, those clients are rather vocal in telling you that you have to keep representing them because “the court said so,” and threatening to file a bar complaint if you back out. It’s awkward but more importantly, you are considering coming off the court-appointed list.
Is there any relief in sight?
Answer
Rule 6.5 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which governs non-profit and court-annexed limited legal services programs, was amended by order of the Virginia Supreme Court on May 16, 2025 (effective July 15, 2025) to address this situation.
 
The introductory paragraph of Rule 6.5(a), with new text shown in bold italics, now reads as follows:
 
“A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, including a court-appointed short-term limited scope representation, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without the lawyer being retained or appointed to continue representation in the matter:”
 
As always, this is subject to conflict of interest or disqualification Rules.
 
The comments in the petition to amend the rule state: “Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services — such as advice or the completion of legal forms — that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as court-appointed representation at first appearance, legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer’s representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.”

 

September 23, 2025
Hypothetical
You have an active court-appointed practice and you sometimes take cases from non-profit organizations because you want to give back to the community. Your niche is providing short-term limited scope representation, such as a bond motion or arraignment.
 
Lately, though, those clients are rather vocal in telling you that you have to keep representing them because “the court said so,” and threatening to file a bar complaint if you back out. It’s awkward but more importantly, you are considering coming off the court-appointed list.
Is there any relief in sight?
Answer
Rule 6.5 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which governs non-profit and court-annexed limited legal services programs, was amended by order of the Virginia Supreme Court on May 16, 2025 (effective July 15, 2025) to address this situation.
 
The introductory paragraph of Rule 6.5(a), with new text shown in bold italics, now reads as follows:
 
“A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, including a court-appointed short-term limited scope representation, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without the lawyer being retained or appointed to continue representation in the matter:”
 
As always, this is subject to conflict of interest or disqualification Rules.
 
The comments in the petition to amend the rule state: “Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services — such as advice or the completion of legal forms — that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as court-appointed representation at first appearance, legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer’s representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.”

 

September 16, 2025
Poison pills, also known as shareholder rights plans, are one of the most powerful tools available to corporate boards seeking to defend against unsolicited or aggressive acquisition attempts. Once in place, the pill makes it virtually impossible for a hostile bidder to gain control without negotiating with the board, as removal of the pill is entirely at the board’s discretion. They serve to dilute the value of shares targeted by the acquirer, thereby making the transaction economically unviable unless the board consents. Boards may reject acquisition offers they believe undervalue the company’s long-term potential. Poison pills buy time to pursue organic growth or wait for a better offer. 

A Modern Example

 

One recent example of a highly publicized case that illuminates this tactic is Elon Musk’s 2022 acquisition of Twitter, Inc. This transaction began as a textbook hostile takeover and triggered a rare deployment of a poison pill by a major public company in the digital era. In April 2022, after acquiring a 9.2% stake in Twitter, Musk made an unsolicited offer to buy the remaining shares for approximately $44 billion, representing a premium over Twitter’s then-market price. In response, Twitter’s board adopted a limited-duration shareholder rights plan (the poison pill), which would allow all other shareholders—except Musk—to purchase additional shares at a 50% discount if any one shareholder acquired more than 15% of Twitter’s stock without board approval. 

This type of poison pill—classified as a “flip-in” provision—is designed to dilute the acquiring party’s stake, making the takeover far more costly. Despite the poison pill, Musk succeeded in acquiring Twitter after negotiating directly with the board, resulting in the board’s unanimous approval of the deal. The pill was then rescinded. The Twitter board’s use of a poison pill underscores a key insight: while poison pills can deter hostile suitors temporarily, they also create leverage to extract higher bids or improved deal terms. 

Pros and Cons 

From a governance perspective, the debate centers on whether boards should have wide discretion to adopt such measures. On one hand, scholars like Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. argue that poison pills—particularly when adopted or maintained without meaningful shareholder input—can entrench incumbent management and prevent shareholders from exercising their fundamental right to decide whether to accept a takeover offer. They propose that Delaware courts should conduct stricter constitutional scrutiny of poison pills, especially when they remain in place for extended periods without shareholder approval. [Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Return of Poison Pills: A First Look at “Crisis Pills,” Harvard Law Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (May 6, 2020).] 

On the other hand, some legal commentators contend that boards must retain sufficient flexibility and discretion to respond to takeover threats, particularly those involving coercive tactics or bids that undervalue the firm’s long-term potential. They discuss how defensive measures— including poison pills—can serve legitimate purposes when properly deployed. 

September 9, 2025

The Client’s Request

“I just need to run some ‘business’ money through your trust account real quick—totally normal, right?”
 
Legal Analysis
 
Under Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct (VRPC) 1.15, attorneys have a duty to safeguard client property and avoid commingling funds. Misusing a trust account to obscure the origin of funds is not only unethical but also illegal under federal anti-money laundering statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Attorneys who allow their trust accounts to be used for improper purposes risk disbarment and criminal prosecution.
 
The rule is clear: trust accounts must only be used for legitimate legal purposes directly related to representation. Allowing a client to use your account as a financial shield—whether for tax evasion, fraud, or hiding assets—violates this rule.
 
Case Law: United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2001): A lawyer was convicted for laundering cartel money through his firm. In a 2020 Virginia State Bar proceeding, a Virginia attorney was suspended for using a trust account to obscure client transactions in violation of VRPC 1.15.

Hypothetical Scenario

A client going through a divorce asks you to hold $500,000 in your trust account, claiming it’s “to keep it away from his wife.” Federal investigators later contact you because the funds are tied to financial fraud.
 

Model Answer

 “I cannot use my trust account for anything other than legitimate legal transactions directly related to your case. Misusing these funds would violate both ethical rules under VRPC 1.15 and federal laws on money laundering. You must disclose all assets during your divorce proceedings, and I recommend consulting a forensic accountant to explore lawful ways to protect your finances.”
August 26, 2025

Background and case history

 
In a memorable 2023 U.S. Supreme Court trademark case, Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, 599 U.S. 140 (2023), Jack Daniel’s faced off against VIP Products, a company that makes chewable dog toys to mimic famous alcoholic beverages.

The first three paragraphs of Justice Kagan’s majority opinion present the trademark issues and the Court’s holding in an engaging and succinct style:

“This case is about dog toys and whiskey, two items seldom appearing in the same sentence. Respondent VIP Products makes a squeaky, chewable dog toy designed to look like a bottle of Jack Daniel’s whiskey. Though not entirely. On the toy, for example, the words ‘Jack Daniel’s’ become ‘Bad Spaniels.’ And the descriptive phrase ‘Old No. 7 Brand Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey’ turns into ‘The Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet.’ The jokes did not impress petitioner Jack Daniel’s Properties. It owns trademarks in the distinctive Jack Daniel’s bottle and in many of the words and graphics on the label. And it believed Bad Spaniels had both infringed and diluted those trademarks. Bad Spaniels had infringed the marks, the argument ran, by leading consumers to think that Jack Daniel’s had created, or was otherwise responsible for, the dog toy. And Bad Spaniels had diluted the marks, the argument went on, by associating the famed whiskey with, well, dog excrement.”

“The Court of Appeals, in the decision we review, saw things differently. Though the federal trademark statute makes infringement turn on the likelihood of consumer confusion, the Court of Appeals never got to that issue. On the court’s view, the First Amendment compels a stringent threshold test when an infringement suit challenges a so-called expressive work—here (so said the court), the Bad Spaniels toy. And that test knocked out Jack Daniel’s claim, whatever the likelihood of confusion. Likewise, Jack’s dilution claim failed—though on that issue the problem was statutory. The trademark law provides that the ‘noncommercial’ use of a mark cannot count as dilution. 15 U. S. C. § 1125(c)(3)(C). The Bad Spaniels marks, the court held, fell within that exemption because the toy communicated a message—a kind of parody—about Jack Daniel’s.”

“Today, we reject both conclusions. The infringement issue is the more substantial. In addressing it, we do not decide whether the threshold inquiry applied in the Court of Appeals is ever warranted. We hold only that it is not appropriate when the accused infringer has used a trademark to designate the source of its own goods—in other words, has used a trademark as a trademark. That kind of use falls within the heartland of trademark law, and does not receive special First Amendment protection. The dilution issue is more simply addressed. The use of a mark does not count as noncommercial just because it parodies, or otherwise comments on, another’s products.”
Photos from Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, 599 U.S. 140, 148-49
 

The 2025 District Court decision on remand

VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866.
 
On the issue of dilution, the district court agreed with the expert psychologist’s consumer psychology research because “Bad Spaniels creates a negative association with Jack Daniel’s whiskey by associating whiskey with dog feces.” Interestingly, the court’s entire examination of the tarnishment question revolved around the replacement of “Old No. 7 Tennessee whiskey” with “Old No. 2 on the Tennessee carpet.” If VIP had used a different, less feces-evoking text, it may have successfully defended against the dilution claim.
 
On the issue of infringement, the district court weighed heavily the Supreme Court’s holding that “a trademark’s expressive message—particularly a parodic one, as VIP assert[ed]—may properly figure in assessing the likelihood of confusion.” The district court therefore examined whether the parodic nature of Bad Spaniels outweighed the potential for consumer confusion. The district court found that Jack Daniel’s had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that “Bad Spaniels” infringed on Jack Daniel’s trademark rights.
 
However, as Jack Daniel’s did show, by way of expert testimony on well-documented consumer psychology research, that “Bad Spaniels” was likely to tarnish Jack Daniel’s trademarks and trade dress, and as it was only necessary for Jack Daniel’s to prevail on one of its counterclaims in order to obtain an injunction, the district court found that a permanent injunction was appropriate.

 

August 19, 2025
After various rule changes over the past five-plus years, the Supreme Court of Virginia (SCV) has settled on a path for litigants to directly appeal any preliminary or temporary injunction decision directly to the SCV—one of the rare instances where a litigant can skip the Court of Appeals of Virginia. Specifically, a litigant can appeal a circuit court decision to “(i) grant[ ] a preliminary injunction, (ii) refuse[ ] such an injunction, [or] (iii) having granted such an injunction, dissolve[ ] or refuse[ ] to enlarge it.” Code of Virginia § 8.01-626.

The current procedure for these immunity and preliminary injunction appeals lies in § 8.01-626, which states that an appealing party may file a petition for review with the clerk of the SCV within 15 days of the circuit court’s order.

The clerk shall assign the petition to a three-justice panel of the SCV. The aggrieved party shall serve a copy of the petition for review on the counsel for the opposing party, which may file a response within 15 days from the date of service unless otherwise determined by the court. The petition for review shall be accompanied by a copy of the proceedings before the circuit court, including the original papers and the circuit court’s order respecting the injunction. The SCV may take such action thereon as it considers appropriate under the circumstances of the case.

Nothing in § 8.01-626 shall be construed to prevent the SCV from resolving a petition for review by an order joined by more than three justices.

In practice, review of these injunctions has been quick. In many instances, the SCV has issued an appellate decision. 
 

Some takeaways here:

  • The briefing schedule is tight. The appealing party files the petition for review within 15 days of the interlocutory decision, and the opposing party then has only 15 days to respond. This is all that is required to make the interlocutory decision ripe for reversal/affirmance.
    • But the SCV may order additional briefing, oral argument, etc. “as it considers appropriate.” This means it could be docketed on their regular docket with full briefing and argument before all seven justices.
  • The SCV can reverse/affirm with just three justices. This inherently means the SCV can act more quickly because it normally must consider the opinions of all seven justices.
     
  • In practice, their injunction decisions have been quick—sometimes issuing reversals or affirmances within just three months of the circuit court’s order on the injunction. See, e.g., Leggett v. Sanctuary at False Cape Condominium Association, Inc., 303 Va. 128 (2024); Commonwealth v. Sadler Bros. Oil Co., No. 230610, 2023 WL 9693656 (Va. Oct. 13, 2023) (unpublished); Loudoun Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Cross, No. 210584, 2021 WL 9276274 (Va. Aug. 30, 2021) (unpublished). 
Safe to say, these changes give litigants facing a preliminary injunction a lot of options and expedited appellate review.

In addition, this appellate procedure also applies to immunity decisions.
See §§ 8.01-670.2, 8.01-626.

 

July 30, 2025

Using multi-factor authentication can keep your workplace safer.

Upping your cybersecurity game is particularly challenging for solo and small firm lawyers because funds available for cybersecurity are often limited. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is by far the top choice among all of recommendations to keep your workplace secure. According to Microsoft’s data analysis, implementing MFA will stop 99.9% of credential-based account takeovers. Considering that MFA is generally a no cost solution, you can’t get much more bang for your buck.

Put simply, MFA is another factor used to log on to an account or access a service. The default MFA for most systems is delivery of a code via SMS text message. In other words, you log on (step one) and a code is sent via text to your phone. You then enter the code to the system (step two) in order to complete the logon process.

Of all the MFA delivery mechanisms, SMS text is the least secure. However, even though it is not as secure as other delivery methods, it is FAR better than not having any MFA at all. So, if text is your only choice, by all means use it. A more secure method is to use an authentication app (e.g. Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, Authy, Duo, etc.) that generates a code every 30 seconds. Instead of entering the code received in a text message, you enter the code that displays in the authentication app. If you have a choice between text messages and an authentication app, choose the app. An even more secure method is to use push notifications to the authentication app. Finally, the most secure MFA method is to use a physical token, also known as a hardware token. These are small, portable devices that generate a unique, time-sensitive code used for MFA.

Some of the language about MFA is foreign, especially to solo/small firm attorneys, but a little extra research online will quickly help you understand MFA and how to implement it. Guidance from whoever provides your cybersecurity support is recommended. 
July 28, 2025
The proferring party must present someone who is prepared to testify about the company’s or entity’s knowledge. If the individual does not have all of that knowledge, then the proffering party (usually  counsel) must prepare the witness to have it at the deposition. A properly prepared witness knows more than what’s required. Remember that the person’s job is to be a good witness.
 
A prepared witness…
 
A properly prepared witness knows more than what’s required. He or she must know what is needed to (a) support the entity’s case, (b) survive cross-examination and (c) make a good impression. Remember that the person’s job is to be a good witness. Good witnesses don’t get shredded on cross. And they don’t turn off the court or jury by making lousy impressions.
 
Good witnesses ought to know:
  • The name(s)of the opposing party(ies) and those primarily affected by the underlying event  
  • The entity’s official positions on relevant matters (including those in press releases, submissions to regulators, web pages, YouTube channels);  
  • The entity’s prior statements;  
  • What people are saying about the entity that’s relevant to the case; and  
  • How to conduct oneself during the deposition.  
 
What a witness ought NOT to know
 
One should ensure that the witness doesn’t go beyond his/her remit. The witness is typically not an expert on the detailed facts of the case. Usually, there are fact and expert witnesses who can comment on the particular facts of the case. 
July 28, 2025

Consider

One of your clients is bidding on a federal contract. You file a bid protest at GAO on behalf of your client. When the Agency produces its agency report, you notice that the Agency did not securely redact certain information, but instead obscured portions of the report using black highlighting. You did not inform the lawyer for the Agency that the redactions were ineffective. Instead, you manipulated the documents electronically and discovered you were able to read all the redacted parts.

Which Rule of Professional Conduct have you violated?

Answer

Rule 4.4(b) Respect for Rights of Third Persons: “A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information is privileged and was inadvertently sent shall immediately terminate review or use of the document or electronically stored information, promptly notify the sender, and abide by the sender’s instructions to return or destroy the document or electronically stored information.”
June 17, 2025

Historically, lawsuits challenging a local governing body on a zoning matter were usually drawn out, discovery intensive, and expensive for all parties. These challenges brought uncertainty to the business of land development and the affected neighborhoods and frustrated the land use objectives of localities.

Savvy attorneys often cherry-picked parts of the legislative record that helped their case and attached a handful of supporting documents to their complaints but left out the vast parts of the record that would cut against their arguments. A well-pleaded complaint would rarely be decided on demurrer.

But more recently Virginia courts have been willing to decide these kinds of cases at the pleading stage. Much of this trend has been fueled by the increasing use of motions craving oyer to place the full legislative record before a court at the pleading stage. Given that judicial review of legislative acts involves the application of the “fairly debatable” rule, getting the entire legislative record before the court at the pleading stage can produce favorable outcomes for localities at the earliest stages of a legal challenge.

I. Motions Craving Oyer at Common Law

Byrne v. City of Alexandria, 298 Va. 694, 842 S.E.2d 409 (2020), contains an excellent summary of the evolution of motions craving oyer at common law. They originated at English common law when many litigants were illiterate, and they served as a method by which a defendant sued on a claim based on a written document could have the document produced in court and read aloud. The Byrne court noted that “[t]he development of the oyer-demurrer remedy did not advance through the years in an orderly progression.” Originally, motions craving oyer were only available to compel production of deeds, writs, bonds, letters of probate and administration, and documents under seal. Their use was expanded throughout the 19th century to include certain other types of documents, including some contracts.

The Virginia Supreme Court attempted to provide clarity in Culpeper National Bank v. Morris, 168 Va. 379, 191 S.E. 764 (1937), a suit involving enforcement of a judgment lien against executors and beneficiaries under a will. The court affirmed a trial court’s grant of oyer and dismissal on demurrer, stating: “No intelligent construction of any writing or record can be made unless all of the essential parts of such paper or record are produced. A litigant has no right to put blinkers on the court and attempt to restrict its vision to only such parts of the record as the litigant thinks tend to support his view. When a court is asked to make a ruling upon any paper or record, it is its duty to require the pleader to produce all material parts.”

II. In Modern Practice

In Byrne, the trial court considered a motion craving oyer brought by the City of Alexandria in response to a landowner’s challenge to the city council’s decision affirming an architectural review board’s action. The court granted the City’s motion and received the legislative record for its consideration before ruling on the City’s demurrer. Ultimately, it sustained the demurrer and entered a final order dismissing the landowner’s petition with prejudice. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, citing Culpeper National Bank with approval.

In challenges to legislative actions in land use cases, demurrers coupled with motions craving oyer (with citations to Byrne) are now routine. The oyer-demurrer route is particularly effective when defending against challenges to legislative acts because defense of such acts does not require any showing by a preponderance of the evidence. Instead, such acts are judged using the “fairly debatable” rule.

June 20, 2025

Lawyers are generally familiar with the basic concepts relating to attorney-client privilege, including the need to maintain confidentiality and avoid waiver. Clients often are not.

Privilege can be especially difficult to maintain in the estate planning context, where the lawyer’s work often involves:

  • individual clients who are not sophisticated in legal matters;
  • clients whose capacity may be diminishing;
  • multiple clients in a single representation;
  • non-client family members, friends, and caregivers; and
  • other professionals like accountants and investment advisors.

Accordingly, to alert clients about the importance of confidentiality and waiver, consider labeling your e-mails and other communications with your clients “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL.” While the privileged nature of a document does not depend on whether it is labeled in any particular way, applying a label reminds clients and others who may receive the document that its contents should be kept confidential. The label also makes it easier for you or others who may later be responding to a discovery request to identify communications that should be withheld on privilege grounds.

Consider advising the client (in writing) about the privilege. A simple message could read as follows: “You’ll see that my e-mails often include ‘privileged and confidential’ at the top. Your communications with us about the substance of our representation will ordinarily be protected by the attorney-client privilege, meaning that neither you nor we will be required to disclose them to anyone. (That’s true whether we include the ‘privileged and confidential’ label or not, but I often include those words as a reminder.) The privilege can be waived if we disclose our communications to a third party, and if that happens [insert names of people client views/view as adverse], creditors, or someone else could gain access to them if you end up in litigation. So please make sure that youkeep our e-mails and other written communications private. The same goes for things we say to each other on the phone.”

June 3, 2025

Lawyers are generally familiar with the basic concepts relating to attorney-client privilege, including the need to maintain confidentiality and avoid waiver. Clients often are not.

Privilege can be especially difficult to maintain in the estate planning context, where the lawyer’s work often involves:

  • individual clients who are not sophisticated in legal matters;
  • clients whose capacity may be diminishing;
  • multiple clients in a single representation;
  • non-client family members, friends, and caregivers; and
  • other professionals like accountants and investment advisors.

Accordingly, to alert clients about the importance of confidentiality and waiver, consider labeling your e-mails and other communications with your clients “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL.” While the privileged nature of a document does not depend on whether it is labeled in any particular way, applying a label reminds clients and others who may receive the document that its contents should be kept confidential. The label also makes it easier for you or others who may later be responding to a discovery request to identify communications that should be withheld on privilege grounds.

Consider advising the client (in writing) about the privilege. A simple message could read as follows: “You’ll see that my e-mails often include ‘privileged and confidential’ at the top. Your communications with us about the substance of our representation will ordinarily be protected by the attorney-client privilege, meaning that neither you nor we will be required to disclose them to anyone. (That’s true whether we include the ‘privileged and confidential’ label or not, but I often include those words as a reminder.) The privilege can be waived if we disclose our communications to a third party, and if that happens [insert names of people client views/view as adverse], creditors, or someone else could gain access to them if you end up in litigation. So please make sure that youkeep our e-mails and other written communications private. The same goes for things we say to each other on the phone.”

May 27, 2025

The consequences of failing to include a necessary party can be significant. The defendant may raise the issue by motion during the litigation, but the failure to raise the issue does not constitute a waiver.

Crucially, the appellate court can even raise the issue itself sua sponte. In fact, in a recent unreported Court of Appeals case, the Court raised the issue of the absence of a necessary party even though neither the plaintiff nor defendant raised the issue.

Despite the fact that both the plaintiff and defendant were in agreement that no necessary parties were absent from the case, the Court summarily reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court after determining that there was a necessary party that was not joined in the case. In doing so, the Court stated in its unpublished order that: “Where the absence of a necessary party in the circuit court cannot be excused, this Court will ‘reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.’” Stanojevic v. Alves, Record No. 1038-23-4 (March 12, 2024) (citing Siska Tr. v. Milestone Dev., 282 Va. 169, 182, 715 S.E.2d 21, 28 (2011)).

The practitioner should take great care in deciding whether to include a party who may be considered necessary: the inclusion of that party could increase the cost of litigation, but the exclusion of that party could lead to an extended motions practice or even an ultimate declaration that the court does not have jurisdiction to render judgment.

May 20, 2025

Recent high-profile bankruptcy cases have raised a relatively new issue: manufactured jurisdiction and venue. The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “affiliate” is broad, encompassing many standard parent-subsidiary relationships. Using this broad power to affiliate, companies facing large liability issues and class action lawsuits have employed a controversial Texas business law maneuver, known formally as a “divisional merger” but more well known as the “Texas Two-Step.”

This divisional merger splits their old corporate entity in two, assigning assets to a new corporate entity that will continue on outside of bankruptcy while assigning the liability to another new corporate entity that is destined to file bankruptcy. After completing the “Texas Two-Step,” either a shell corporate entity will file for bankruptcy in the desired jurisdiction and then the liability-laden new corporate entity will associate itself with the shell entity and file in the same district or the liability-laden entity will reorganize itself in the target jurisdiction and file for bankruptcy protection.

While the main issue litigated in the “Texas Two-Step” bankruptcies has thus far been dismissal due to bad faith, the Fourth Circuit in Bestwall LLC v. Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants (In re Bestwall LLC), 71 F.4th 168 (4th Cir. 2023), addressed whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1359, which provides that district courts lack jurisdiction over civil actions “in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.” While the Bestwall majority dismissed the section 1359 arguments, the dissent found that the debtor’s use of the “Texas Two-Step” “ran afoul of the foundational principle that parties may not artificially construct a federal court’s jurisdiction—especially that of a federal bankruptcy court, which possesses particularly limited jurisdiction.” While the issue has not been well addressed, many scholars and legislators have likewise criticized the “Texas Two-Step” as a misuse of the bankruptcy system.

May 13, 2025

Hypothetical

Defendant is charged with one count of grand larceny. The Commonwealth calls Sandra Security Officer as a witness, who testifies that on January 30, 2025, she was on duty at Department Store and arrested Defendant after she observed him selecting a suitcase, going through the store and placing a pair of jeans in the suitcase, then leaving the store without paying for the suitcase or the jeans. When asked if she is aware of the value of the suitcase and the jeans, she responds that she is because part of her job is to make sure that each item in the store has a price tag on it and she has seen the price tags for the stolen jeans and suitcase.

When the prosecutor then asks her what the prices of the jeans and suitcase are, Defense Counsel objects, arguing that the expected testimony violates the best evidence rule and the bar against hearsay.


Should the objection be sustained or overruled?

Answer

The best evidence objection should be sustained. Price tags — as distinguished from “inscribed chattels” — are writings within the best evidence rule. Jennings v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 669 (2015).

The hearsay objection also should be sustained on these facts. Although in retail theft cases, price tags affixed to items for sale or testimony concerning the amounts on the tags are an exception to the bar against hearsay, Va. Rule 2:803(24); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 10 (1999), that exception contains a caveat that limits it to situations where there is no objection on best evidence grounds.  Jennings, 65 Va. App. at 679.