
A “time is of the essence” term is not an implied term in a real estate contract under Virginia law. If time is to be of the essence in a contract, a careful drafter will include the term “time is of the essence,” as well as additional language making it absolutely clear that the clause is included because it is intended to be part of the consideration for the mutual benefit of the contracting parties and because the inclusion of the clause is an important part of the inducement for the execution of the contract. |
Most REALTORS® do not recommend that a “time is of the essence” clause be inserted in a residential sales contract, and many lawyers would give the same advice to their clients. |
The insertion of such a clause may excuse performance of a contract as a result of a minor default that causes no harm to the other party. The buyer or seller could opt out simply because of remorse or because a better offer has been made or received. Insertion of such a clause could permit the termination of a contract in situations where one party would enjoy a financial gain that became available after the contract was signed. Where a “time is of the essence” clause is present, the attorney for either party should alert his or her client to the clause and its meaning. |
In Garofalo v. Di Vincenzo, Record No. 250094 (Va. Feb. 26, 2026), a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Virginia defined the standard for “evident partiality” as a ground for vacating an arbitration award under the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act, Code of Virginia §8.01-581.010(2). That particular question had not appeared before the Virginia Supreme Court before—the court has now held that “a party seeking vacatur for evident partiality must objectively demonstrate that a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would conclude that the arbitrator’s conduct signifies obvious bias against that party.” Upon conclusion of the arbitration, Garofalo sought to vacate the award based on “evident partiality” by an attorney arbitrator, claiming that some connections between that attorney and Di Vincenzo were not disclosed as required. |
The Court used both the Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary to conduct a plain-meaning analysis of the standard: |
…“evident,” means “clear to the vision or understanding…” synonymous with “manifest, patent, distinct, obvious, [and] apparent.” Evident, Webster’s Ninth New College Dictionary 430 (1983)… [it] denotes more than a conceivable or nebulous appearance of bias—it means an appearance that a person would recognize in a conclusive way. …“partiality” (or “partial”), means “inclined to favor one party more than the other.” Partial, Webster’s Ninth New College Dictionary 858 (1983)… If disinterest is the norm for arbitrators, partiality would describe a deviation from that expectation. (some citations omitted) |
The resulting standard? |
“A party seeking vacatur for evident partiality must objectively demonstrate that a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would conclude that the arbitrator’s conduct signifies obvious bias against that party,” met through “objective evidence of conduct inconsistent with impartiality—not necessarily proof of the arbitrator’s actual subjective bias, nor a presumption of bias from every party-arbitrator interaction.” The Court emphasized that the very nature of arbitration, with its “many forms… and… varied relationships…—whether industry-specific or between arbitrators, parties, and their attorneys,” resists rigid, bright lined standards and formulaic approaches. Applied to the facts in this case, that standard could not be met—the attorney arbitrator’s prior contacts with Di Vincenzo were far too remote, attenuated, and immaterial. Neither their prior business interactions nor the contractual and financial relationship between companies rose to the level of objective evidence leading a reasonable person to find obvious bias against Garofalo. |
Artificial intelligence (AI) is likely to be the top headline of 2026. That hot topic has been nearly unavoidable in business, sports, entertainment, social media … and maybe in legal circles. When it comes to adoption of AI technology, there are many open ethical questions for lawyers to consider, and those might leave you wondering: |
Can’t my firm really just do without? |
Maybe not. According to Karim Lakhani of the Harvard Business School and author of Competing in the Age of AI: Strategy and Leadership When Algorithms and Networks Run the World, “AI won’t replace humans — but humans with AI will replace humans without AI.” This quote, which originally appeared in the Harvard Business Review on August 4, 2023, set the tone for Tom Dunlap’s recent overview of the state of AI in a VirginiaCLE seminar. Here are just some of the highlights, drawn from a variety of published surveys and reports: |
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A court may sit with all members present en banc (literally, “from the bench”) for review of a decision previously made by a smaller panel of the same. |
Example |
Interested parties in the federal contracting process, such as unsuccessful bidders, may formally protest the terms of a government solicitation or the award of a contract. These protests can be filed directly with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Federal Claims), or if first unsuccessfully filed with the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), refiled with Federal Claims as an “effective appeal.” Obviously, there is not time for en banc review of every protest: in 2025 alone, GAO received 1,688 protests (including cost claims and requests for reconsideration). |
Procedure and standard of review |
Instead, these claims are first heard by a three-judge panel of Federal Claims and only reviewed by the court en banc if that merits panel has failed to follow existing US Supreme Court or federal circuit decisions precedent or the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance. Petitions for mere panel rehearing are reviewed by the three judges that issued the opinion; petitions for rehearing en banc are reviewed by all eligible judges of the court. |
Hypothetical |
Buck Nichols represents Sawyer, who was previously employed as an IT analyst with TS Consulting LLC. While employed, Sawyer raised questions about whether TS Consulting was properly paying for software licenses that it was installing on its clients’ computers. Sawyer also had problems with attendance and tardiness, and after several warnings, his employment was terminated. Buck brings a claim on behalf of Sawyer, asserting that Sawyer was fired in violation of the Virginia Whistleblower Protection Law. During discovery, Buck is served with interrogatories by the defense counsel, including a standard interrogatory about Sawyer’s damages. In response to what earnings Sawyer has had since his termination from TS Consulting, Sawyer answers that he’s not been able to find other work and has had no income for the last seven months. Buck has Sawyer sign the Interrogatory Answers under oath and serves them on the defense counsel. Just prior to the parties beginning depositions, they decide to mediate the case. The morning of the mediation, after Buck and Sawyer have met with the mediator privately and told their story, Sawyer looks at Buck and says, “If I tell you something, you can’t tell anyone, right? I mean you’re my lawyer and this is all covered by the privilege, right?” Buck assures him of the solemnity of the attorney-client privilege, whereupon Sawyer tells him: “You know how I said I haven’t been working for the last seven months? Well, that’s not exactly true. My cousin runs his own IT shop, and he’s been paying me about $7000 a month as a consultant to help him with his business. But don’t tell the other side or the mediator. Let’s see if we can get this settled today without them finding out.” Buck now knows that the sworn interrogatory answers that he served in the case were not truthful and that he will have to amend them if the case doesn’t settle. |
Questions and Answers |
Is it ethically permissible for Buck to move forward with getting the case settled that day without apprising his opposing counsel of the false information in interrogatory answers? |
No. As reflected in LEO 1477, Buck cannot move forward with the mediation without informing opposing counsel of his need to correct the Answers to Interrogatories. A settlement entered into in reliance on sworn, yet incorrect, answers would be fraudulently induced, whether the attorney verbally reaffirms the incorrect answers or simply remains silent as to their inaccuracy during the mediation process. |
What if a settlement in principle has been reached during the mediation, and the parties have signed a term sheet which explicitly states it will be turned into a settlement agreement when Sawyer makes his disclosure to you? |
The fact that a settlement had been reached in principle would not make any difference in this situation. Buck’s duty to the tribunal, as well as to his opponent, mandates that he correct the sworn answers prior to finalizing the settlement – even if such disclosure might blow up the settlement. |
What if the term sheet was turned into a settlement agreement, signed by all parties, the settlement funds paid, and a dismissal with prejudice filed with the court when Sawyer makes his disclosure to Buck? |
This becomes a more difficult situation, as Buck was not aware of the false statement by his client until after the settlement had been completely consummated in the case dismissed and no longer pending before the tribunal. Arguably, Buck’s duty to the tribunal and to his opponent on that particular matter has ceased. |
What if, instead of including this information in sworn interrogatory answers, Buck had merely stated in his initial demand letter to the employer (based on information that Sawyer gave him) that his client has been unable to find any work for the last seven months? |
As the parties are not in court, Rule 3.3 would not seem applicable yet. But Buck still must grapple with Rule 4.1 and Rule 8.4. As a matter of professional ethics, as well as personal integrity, when Buck finds out that the information that his client had provided him for the demand letter was not accurate, it is incumbent upon Buck to inform his opponent. |
Virginia Code § 20-79(b) provides: “In any suit for divorce, the court in which the suit is instituted or pending, when either party to the proceedings so requests, shall provide in its decree for the maintenance, support, care or custody of the child or children in accordance with Chapter 6.1 (§ 20-124.1 et seq.), support and maintenance for the spouse, if the same be sought, and counsel fees and other costs, if in the judgment of the court any or all of the foregoing should be so decreed.” With this authority, the question turns to: |
What factors may affect “the judgment of the court” that fees should be decreed? |
Whether to award fees and in what amount are matters of discretion vested in the trial court. An award of attorney’s fees is a matter submitted to the trial court’s sound discretion and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Ingram v. Ingram, 217 Va. 27, 29, 225 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1976). Virginia Code §§ 20-79(b) and 20-99(6) provide the statutory basis for the broad discretionary authority circuit courts have to award attorney’s fees and other costs as the equities of a divorce case and its ancillary proceedings may require. The Virginia Court of Appeals has stated, “This discretionary authority also extends to related post-divorce proceedings.” Tyszcenko v. Donatelli, 53 Va. App. 209, 222, 670 S.E.2d 49, 56 (2008). Significantly, however, there is no prevailing-party entitlement to fees under Code §§ 20-79(b) and [former] 20-99(5). The appellate court went on to say, “Instead, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, may award attorney’s fees and costs to ‘either party as equity and justice may require.’” Id. (quoting Virginia Code § 20-99(6)). Therefore, after considering “the circumstances of the parties” and “the equities of the entire case,” a trial court may exercise its discretion and issue an award of attorney’s fees and costs that is reasonable “under all of the circumstances revealed by the record.” |
So, what kinds of factors do matter? |
Although as noted, there is no “prevailing party entitlement,” as a practical matter, prevailing does matter, as do the comparative incomes and assets of the parties, the reasonableness of fees, and the reasons that incurring fees became necessary, among other things. When possible, therefore, bifurcate claims for awards of fees from the remaining issues. Bifurcation so that the fee argument is offered only after the outcome is known permits the court to learn which party was unrealistic or unfair in settlement efforts, which can in turn affect the decision of whether to award fees, or how much to award. |
In Amazon Logistics, Inc. v. Va. Emp. Comm’n, 304 Va. 107 (2025), the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that: “A litigant cannot ‘approbate and reprobate by taking successive positions in the course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually contradictory,’ or else such arguments are waived.” Rowe v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 495, 502 (2009). Litigants cannot “‘blow[ ] hot and cold’ depending on their perceived self-interests.” Babcock & Wilcox v. Areva, 292 Va. 165, 204 (2016). They must “elect a particular position” and are thereafter confined “to the position that [they] first adopted.” Matthews v. Matthews, 277 Va. 522, 528 (2009). As the Court stated in the first paragraph of its decision: |
“Put more colloquially, Amazon [the appellant] now ‘zigs’ when it previously ‘zagged.’ This stratagem, therefore, fails—as it must.” |
Amazon had sought a class-wide ruling from the Virginia Employment Commission that all Amazon Flex drivers were independent contractors. After the Commission instead found all Flex drivers were employees, Amazon appealed and argued the record was insufficient to support a class-wide ruling. The Supreme Court held that Amazon waived its arguments through inadequate briefing under Rule 5:27 and by approbating and reprobating its position. Amazon’s “brief assigns error on one ground, but then fails to specifically argue those grounds in the body of the brief,” which constitutes waiver “as an inadequately developed argument supporting an assignment of error (colloquially called a bad-brief waiver) in violation of Rule 5:27(d).” Amazon Logistics, Inc., at 111-12. “[W]hen the argument on brief, even if carefully crafted and legally persuasive, nonetheless has little, if anything, to do with the assignment of error,” the waiver “applies.” Id. at 112. Amazon could not “approbate and reprobate by taking successive positions in the course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually contradictory.” Id. at 114-15 (internal citation omitted). Amazon “clearly asked for a ruling concerning all Flex drivers. Amazon’s new assertion that it only sought a decision limited to one Flex driver, rather than Flex drivers as a class, is a prime example of a litigant approbating and reprobating its position; the arguments are therefore waived.” Id. at 116. |
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No. |
Improper driving is simply where a defendant is charged with reckless driving, and the judge finds that the defendant’s culpability is “slight” (Va. Code § 46.2-869). The distinction is critical; reckless driving is a Class 1 misdemeanor, whereas improper driving is a mere traffic infraction punishable by a fine of up to $500. A police officer, however, cannot charge improper driving at the time a traffic stop is made; instead, improper driving is a type of discretionary reduction of a reckless driving charge. The authority to reduce a reckless driving charge to improper driving lies with the jury or the trial judge during trial, or with the prosecutor prior to the court’s decision (Chibikom v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 422, 680 S.E.2d 295 (2009)). This discretion is based on a finding that the driver’s level of culpability is slight. Importantly, improper driving is not a lesser-included offense of reckless driving, meaning it does not automatically apply as a step-down charge; it must be affirmatively determined by the finder of fact or offered by the prosecution before a verdict is reached. |
Beginning July 1, 2026, Virginia has established an Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) Program as a penalty for certain speed-related offenses, including reckless driving or drivers exceeding 100 mph and for accumulating demerit points. See Code section 46.2-507 for details about the ISA Program.
The ISA Program requires convicted drivers to install and pay for an ISA system, which limits their vehicle’s speed to the posted limit, serving as an alternative to license suspension in certain cases.
Like ASAP, the defendant can pre-enroll in this program before adjudication of their case.
What’s a conversion clause in a fee agreement? |
This was the topic of LEO 1899 (2023) and a 2025 disciplinary proceeding. |
Questions presented in LEO 1899 |
When a lawyer represents a client on a flat (or fixed) fee agreement, can the agreement provide for an alternative fee arrangement if the representation is prematurely terminated by the client without cause? |
The Answer |
A lawyer’s fee agreement with a client may include an alternative fee arrangement or “conversion clause” if the client terminates the representation prematurely and without cause. However, an alternative fee or conversion provision must be reasonable and adequately explained to the client. |
In 2016, Harris, driving an Enterprise rental car, struck Joplin on his motorcycle. Enterprise sought to settle by offering the policy limit, $25,000, in exchange for a release of claims against both it and Harris. Enterprise never heard back from Joplin. Joplin subsequently sued Harris in 2018 for $300,000.
It turned out that Joplin had signed and notarized the release, but it was only discovered by his lawyer in 2020, and it was so faded that it was illegible. Joplin claimed the release had only been intended to settle with Enterprise, not Harris personally. Harris, in turn, raised a plea of accord and satisfaction, arguing the signed release barred the suit against her as well. To prove the contents of the faded release, she introduced an unsigned but legible version of the same form, along with testimony from Enterprise’s claims adjuster, who confirmed it matched the document Joplin had returned.
The circuit court admitted the unsigned release and ruled for Harris. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the unsigned release to be inadmissible parol evidence. The Supreme Court, in Harris v. Joplin, __ Va. __, 916 S.E.2d 80 (2025), reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, finding that it didnot abuse its discretion. The Court held that the parol evidence rule did not bar the admission of the unsigned release because the unsigned copy was not being used to change or contradict terms but simply to verify an illegible document. (It noted that the more fitting objection would have been under the best evidence rule, which Joplin did not raise.) The Court also clarified that Harris only needed to prove the connection between the two documents by a preponderance of the evidence. Given the adjuster’s testimony and supporting records, there was a sufficient basis to conclude that the signed and unsigned releases were the same. Accordingly, the release barred Joplin’s negligence claim, and final judgment was entered for Harris.
Hypothetical |
You have an active court-appointed practice and you sometimes take cases from non-profit organizations because you want to give back to the community. Your niche is providing short-term limited scope representation, such as a bond motion or arraignment. Lately, though, those clients are rather vocal in telling you that you have to keep representing them because “the court said so,” and threatening to file a bar complaint if you back out. It’s awkward but more importantly, you are considering coming off the court-appointed list. |
Is there any relief in sight? |
Answer |
Rule 6.5 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which governs non-profit and court-annexed limited legal services programs, was amended by order of the Virginia Supreme Court on May 16, 2025 (effective July 15, 2025) to address this situation. The introductory paragraph of Rule 6.5(a), with new text shown in bold italics, now reads as follows: “A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, including a court-appointed short-term limited scope representation, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without the lawyer being retained or appointed to continue representation in the matter:” As always, this is subject to conflict of interest or disqualification Rules. The comments in the petition to amend the rule state: “Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services — such as advice or the completion of legal forms — that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as court-appointed representation at first appearance, legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer’s representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.” |
Hypothetical |
Mother seeks to introduce testimony from a daycare teacher that her 4-year-old Johnny said, “Daddy hit Mommy last night.” Father objects on hearsay grounds. |
Is the child’s statement really hearsay? |
Analysis |
In family law cases, the Best Interests of the Child standard does not override evidence rules. It may be in the child’s best interest for everyone to hear what was said, but if there is not an applicable hearsay exception, the statement is not admissible. “Not all out-of-court communications are hearsay. First, the rule only reaches ‘statements.’ The Virginia Rules of Evidence define a statement for purposes of the hearsay rule as an oral or written assertion. Va. Sup. Ct. R. 2:801(a). In other words, if the declarant states something that cannot be proven true or untrue, i.e. does not make an assertion, then the trier of fact is not asked to make a credibility determination and the purpose of the hearsay rule is not served by exclusion.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 500, 503 (2021). “If the words are offered for their truth, the statements should properly be classified as hearsay, and only then must the court consider if the statements fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. If the statements are not offered for their truth, based on the context and other evidence in the case, including the actual use by the proponent at trial, then the statements are admissible unless they run afoul of some other evidentiary rule.” Id. Traditional hearsay analysis applies if the child’s out-of-court statement is offered for truth but there are potential exceptions:
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Preservation Point |
The proponent must proffer both the specific statement made by the child and the circumstances surrounding it. |
Analysis |
Several states have adopted specific prohibitions on lawyers using certain words when describing themselves in marketing materials. In several states, lawyers are specifically prohibited from from calling themselves experts.
At least one state has specifically prohibited lawyers from using the word “authority” when describing themselves. South Carolina Rule 7.4(b) (advertisements “shall not contain any form of the words ‘certified,’ ‘specialist,’ ‘expert,’ or ‘authority'”). Other states permit lawyers to use words like “expert” and “expertise” if the claims can be “factually substantiated.” Virginia LEO 1750 (revised 12/18/08). |
So, may an attorney claim to be an expert?Best Answer |
The best answer to this hypothetical is maybe. |
Hypothetical |
You have an active court-appointed practice and you sometimes take cases from non-profit organizations because you want to give back to the community. Your niche is providing short-term limited scope representation, such as a bond motion or arraignment. Lately, though, those clients are rather vocal in telling you that you have to keep representing them because “the court said so,” and threatening to file a bar complaint if you back out. It’s awkward but more importantly, you are considering coming off the court-appointed list. |
Is there any relief in sight? |
Answer |
Rule 6.5 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which governs non-profit and court-annexed limited legal services programs, was amended by order of the Virginia Supreme Court on May 16, 2025 (effective July 15, 2025) to address this situation. The introductory paragraph of Rule 6.5(a), with new text shown in bold italics, now reads as follows: “A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, including a court-appointed short-term limited scope representation, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without the lawyer being retained or appointed to continue representation in the matter:” As always, this is subject to conflict of interest or disqualification Rules. The comments in the petition to amend the rule state: “Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services — such as advice or the completion of legal forms — that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as court-appointed representation at first appearance, legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer’s representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.” |
Hypothetical |
You have an active court-appointed practice and you sometimes take cases from non-profit organizations because you want to give back to the community. Your niche is providing short-term limited scope representation, such as a bond motion or arraignment. Lately, though, those clients are rather vocal in telling you that you have to keep representing them because “the court said so,” and threatening to file a bar complaint if you back out. It’s awkward but more importantly, you are considering coming off the court-appointed list. |
Is there any relief in sight? |
Answer |
Rule 6.5 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which governs non-profit and court-annexed limited legal services programs, was amended by order of the Virginia Supreme Court on May 16, 2025 (effective July 15, 2025) to address this situation. The introductory paragraph of Rule 6.5(a), with new text shown in bold italics, now reads as follows: “A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, including a court-appointed short-term limited scope representation, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without the lawyer being retained or appointed to continue representation in the matter:” As always, this is subject to conflict of interest or disqualification Rules. The comments in the petition to amend the rule state: “Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services — such as advice or the completion of legal forms — that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as court-appointed representation at first appearance, legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer’s representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.” |
Poison pills, also known as shareholder rights plans, are one of the most powerful tools available to corporate boards seeking to defend against unsolicited or aggressive acquisition attempts. Once in place, the pill makes it virtually impossible for a hostile bidder to gain control without negotiating with the board, as removal of the pill is entirely at the board’s discretion. They serve to dilute the value of shares targeted by the acquirer, thereby making the transaction economically unviable unless the board consents. Boards may reject acquisition offers they believe undervalue the company’s long-term potential. Poison pills buy time to pursue organic growth or wait for a better offer. |
A Modern ExampleOne recent example of a highly publicized case that illuminates this tactic is Elon Musk’s 2022 acquisition of Twitter, Inc. This transaction began as a textbook hostile takeover and triggered a rare deployment of a poison pill by a major public company in the digital era. In April 2022, after acquiring a 9.2% stake in Twitter, Musk made an unsolicited offer to buy the remaining shares for approximately $44 billion, representing a premium over Twitter’s then-market price. In response, Twitter’s board adopted a limited-duration shareholder rights plan (the poison pill), which would allow all other shareholders—except Musk—to purchase additional shares at a 50% discount if any one shareholder acquired more than 15% of Twitter’s stock without board approval. This type of poison pill—classified as a “flip-in” provision—is designed to dilute the acquiring party’s stake, making the takeover far more costly. Despite the poison pill, Musk succeeded in acquiring Twitter after negotiating directly with the board, resulting in the board’s unanimous approval of the deal. The pill was then rescinded. The Twitter board’s use of a poison pill underscores a key insight: while poison pills can deter hostile suitors temporarily, they also create leverage to extract higher bids or improved deal terms. |
Pros and ConsFrom a governance perspective, the debate centers on whether boards should have wide discretion to adopt such measures. On one hand, scholars like Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. argue that poison pills—particularly when adopted or maintained without meaningful shareholder input—can entrench incumbent management and prevent shareholders from exercising their fundamental right to decide whether to accept a takeover offer. They propose that Delaware courts should conduct stricter constitutional scrutiny of poison pills, especially when they remain in place for extended periods without shareholder approval. [Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Return of Poison Pills: A First Look at “Crisis Pills,” Harvard Law Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (May 6, 2020).] On the other hand, some legal commentators contend that boards must retain sufficient flexibility and discretion to respond to takeover threats, particularly those involving coercive tactics or bids that undervalue the firm’s long-term potential. They discuss how defensive measures— including poison pills—can serve legitimate purposes when properly deployed. |
The Client’s Request“I just need to run some ‘business’ money through your trust account real quick—totally normal, right?” |
Legal Analysis Under Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct (VRPC) 1.15, attorneys have a duty to safeguard client property and avoid commingling funds. Misusing a trust account to obscure the origin of funds is not only unethical but also illegal under federal anti-money laundering statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Attorneys who allow their trust accounts to be used for improper purposes risk disbarment and criminal prosecution. The rule is clear: trust accounts must only be used for legitimate legal purposes directly related to representation. Allowing a client to use your account as a financial shield—whether for tax evasion, fraud, or hiding assets—violates this rule. Case Law: United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2001): A lawyer was convicted for laundering cartel money through his firm. In a 2020 Virginia State Bar proceeding, a Virginia attorney was suspended for using a trust account to obscure client transactions in violation of VRPC 1.15. |
Hypothetical ScenarioA client going through a divorce asks you to hold $500,000 in your trust account, claiming it’s “to keep it away from his wife.” Federal investigators later contact you because the funds are tied to financial fraud. |
Model Answer “I cannot use my trust account for anything other than legitimate legal transactions directly related to your case. Misusing these funds would violate both ethical rules under VRPC 1.15 and federal laws on money laundering. You must disclose all assets during your divorce proceedings, and I recommend consulting a forensic accountant to explore lawful ways to protect your finances.” |
After various rule changes over the past five-plus years, the Supreme Court of Virginia (SCV) has settled on a path for litigants to directly appeal any preliminary or temporary injunction decision directly to the SCV—one of the rare instances where a litigant can skip the Court of Appeals of Virginia. Specifically, a litigant can appeal a circuit court decision to “(i) grant[ ] a preliminary injunction, (ii) refuse[ ] such an injunction, [or] (iii) having granted such an injunction, dissolve[ ] or refuse[ ] to enlarge it.” Code of Virginia § 8.01-626. The current procedure for these immunity and preliminary injunction appeals lies in § 8.01-626, which states that an appealing party may file a petition for review with the clerk of the SCV within 15 days of the circuit court’s order. The clerk shall assign the petition to a three-justice panel of the SCV. The aggrieved party shall serve a copy of the petition for review on the counsel for the opposing party, which may file a response within 15 days from the date of service unless otherwise determined by the court. The petition for review shall be accompanied by a copy of the proceedings before the circuit court, including the original papers and the circuit court’s order respecting the injunction. The SCV may take such action thereon as it considers appropriate under the circumstances of the case. Nothing in § 8.01-626 shall be construed to prevent the SCV from resolving a petition for review by an order joined by more than three justices. In practice, review of these injunctions has been quick. In many instances, the SCV has issued an appellate decision. |
Some takeaways here: |
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Safe to say, these changes give litigants facing a preliminary injunction a lot of options and expedited appellate review. In addition, this appellate procedure also applies to immunity decisions. See §§ 8.01-670.2, 8.01-626. |
Using multi-factor authentication can keep your workplace safer. |
Upping your cybersecurity game is particularly challenging for solo and small firm lawyers because funds available for cybersecurity are often limited. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is by far the top choice among all of recommendations to keep your workplace secure. According to Microsoft’s data analysis, implementing MFA will stop 99.9% of credential-based account takeovers. Considering that MFA is generally a no cost solution, you can’t get much more bang for your buck. Put simply, MFA is another factor used to log on to an account or access a service. The default MFA for most systems is delivery of a code via SMS text message. In other words, you log on (step one) and a code is sent via text to your phone. You then enter the code to the system (step two) in order to complete the logon process. Of all the MFA delivery mechanisms, SMS text is the least secure. However, even though it is not as secure as other delivery methods, it is FAR better than not having any MFA at all. So, if text is your only choice, by all means use it. A more secure method is to use an authentication app (e.g. Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, Authy, Duo, etc.) that generates a code every 30 seconds. Instead of entering the code received in a text message, you enter the code that displays in the authentication app. If you have a choice between text messages and an authentication app, choose the app. An even more secure method is to use push notifications to the authentication app. Finally, the most secure MFA method is to use a physical token, also known as a hardware token. These are small, portable devices that generate a unique, time-sensitive code used for MFA. Some of the language about MFA is foreign, especially to solo/small firm attorneys, but a little extra research online will quickly help you understand MFA and how to implement it. Guidance from whoever provides your cybersecurity support is recommended. |
The proferring party must present someone who is prepared to testify about the company’s or entity’s knowledge. If the individual does not have all of that knowledge, then the proffering party (usually counsel) must prepare the witness to have it at the deposition. A properly prepared witness knows more than what’s required. Remember that the person’s job is to be a good witness. |
A prepared witness… |
A properly prepared witness knows more than what’s required. He or she must know what is needed to (a) support the entity’s case, (b) survive cross-examination and (c) make a good impression. Remember that the person’s job is to be a good witness. Good witnesses don’t get shredded on cross. And they don’t turn off the court or jury by making lousy impressions. |
Good witnesses ought to know: |
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What a witness ought NOT to know |
One should ensure that the witness doesn’t go beyond his/her remit. The witness is typically not an expert on the detailed facts of the case. Usually, there are fact and expert witnesses who can comment on the particular facts of the case. |
Consider |
One of your clients is bidding on a federal contract. You file a bid protest at GAO on behalf of your client. When the Agency produces its agency report, you notice that the Agency did not securely redact certain information, but instead obscured portions of the report using black highlighting. You did not inform the lawyer for the Agency that the redactions were ineffective. Instead, you manipulated the documents electronically and discovered you were able to read all the redacted parts. |
Which Rule of Professional Conduct have you violated? |
Answer |
Rule 4.4(b) Respect for Rights of Third Persons: “A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information is privileged and was inadvertently sent shall immediately terminate review or use of the document or electronically stored information, promptly notify the sender, and abide by the sender’s instructions to return or destroy the document or electronically stored information.” |
Historically, lawsuits challenging a local governing body on a zoning matter were usually drawn out, discovery intensive, and expensive for all parties. These challenges brought uncertainty to the business of land development and the affected neighborhoods and frustrated the land use objectives of localities.
Savvy attorneys often cherry-picked parts of the legislative record that helped their case and attached a handful of supporting documents to their complaints but left out the vast parts of the record that would cut against their arguments. A well-pleaded complaint would rarely be decided on demurrer.
But more recently Virginia courts have been willing to decide these kinds of cases at the pleading stage. Much of this trend has been fueled by the increasing use of motions craving oyer to place the full legislative record before a court at the pleading stage. Given that judicial review of legislative acts involves the application of the “fairly debatable” rule, getting the entire legislative record before the court at the pleading stage can produce favorable outcomes for localities at the earliest stages of a legal challenge.
I. Motions Craving Oyer at Common Law
Byrne v. City of Alexandria, 298 Va. 694, 842 S.E.2d 409 (2020), contains an excellent summary of the evolution of motions craving oyer at common law. They originated at English common law when many litigants were illiterate, and they served as a method by which a defendant sued on a claim based on a written document could have the document produced in court and read aloud. The Byrne court noted that “[t]he development of the oyer-demurrer remedy did not advance through the years in an orderly progression.” Originally, motions craving oyer were only available to compel production of deeds, writs, bonds, letters of probate and administration, and documents under seal. Their use was expanded throughout the 19th century to include certain other types of documents, including some contracts.
The Virginia Supreme Court attempted to provide clarity in Culpeper National Bank v. Morris, 168 Va. 379, 191 S.E. 764 (1937), a suit involving enforcement of a judgment lien against executors and beneficiaries under a will. The court affirmed a trial court’s grant of oyer and dismissal on demurrer, stating: “No intelligent construction of any writing or record can be made unless all of the essential parts of such paper or record are produced. A litigant has no right to put blinkers on the court and attempt to restrict its vision to only such parts of the record as the litigant thinks tend to support his view. When a court is asked to make a ruling upon any paper or record, it is its duty to require the pleader to produce all material parts.”
II. In Modern Practice
In Byrne, the trial court considered a motion craving oyer brought by the City of Alexandria in response to a landowner’s challenge to the city council’s decision affirming an architectural review board’s action. The court granted the City’s motion and received the legislative record for its consideration before ruling on the City’s demurrer. Ultimately, it sustained the demurrer and entered a final order dismissing the landowner’s petition with prejudice. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, citing Culpeper National Bank with approval.
In challenges to legislative actions in land use cases, demurrers coupled with motions craving oyer (with citations to Byrne) are now routine. The oyer-demurrer route is particularly effective when defending against challenges to legislative acts because defense of such acts does not require any showing by a preponderance of the evidence. Instead, such acts are judged using the “fairly debatable” rule.
Lawyers are generally familiar with the basic concepts relating to attorney-client privilege, including the need to maintain confidentiality and avoid waiver. Clients often are not.
Privilege can be especially difficult to maintain in the estate planning context, where the lawyer’s work often involves:
Accordingly, to alert clients about the importance of confidentiality and waiver, consider labeling your e-mails and other communications with your clients “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL.” While the privileged nature of a document does not depend on whether it is labeled in any particular way, applying a label reminds clients and others who may receive the document that its contents should be kept confidential. The label also makes it easier for you or others who may later be responding to a discovery request to identify communications that should be withheld on privilege grounds.
Consider advising the client (in writing) about the privilege. A simple message could read as follows: “You’ll see that my e-mails often include ‘privileged and confidential’ at the top. Your communications with us about the substance of our representation will ordinarily be protected by the attorney-client privilege, meaning that neither you nor we will be required to disclose them to anyone. (That’s true whether we include the ‘privileged and confidential’ label or not, but I often include those words as a reminder.) The privilege can be waived if we disclose our communications to a third party, and if that happens [insert names of people client views/view as adverse], creditors, or someone else could gain access to them if you end up in litigation. So please make sure that youkeep our e-mails and other written communications private. The same goes for things we say to each other on the phone.”
Lawyers are generally familiar with the basic concepts relating to attorney-client privilege, including the need to maintain confidentiality and avoid waiver. Clients often are not.
Privilege can be especially difficult to maintain in the estate planning context, where the lawyer’s work often involves:
Accordingly, to alert clients about the importance of confidentiality and waiver, consider labeling your e-mails and other communications with your clients “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL.” While the privileged nature of a document does not depend on whether it is labeled in any particular way, applying a label reminds clients and others who may receive the document that its contents should be kept confidential. The label also makes it easier for you or others who may later be responding to a discovery request to identify communications that should be withheld on privilege grounds.
Consider advising the client (in writing) about the privilege. A simple message could read as follows: “You’ll see that my e-mails often include ‘privileged and confidential’ at the top. Your communications with us about the substance of our representation will ordinarily be protected by the attorney-client privilege, meaning that neither you nor we will be required to disclose them to anyone. (That’s true whether we include the ‘privileged and confidential’ label or not, but I often include those words as a reminder.) The privilege can be waived if we disclose our communications to a third party, and if that happens [insert names of people client views/view as adverse], creditors, or someone else could gain access to them if you end up in litigation. So please make sure that youkeep our e-mails and other written communications private. The same goes for things we say to each other on the phone.”
The consequences of failing to include a necessary party can be significant. The defendant may raise the issue by motion during the litigation, but the failure to raise the issue does not constitute a waiver.
Crucially, the appellate court can even raise the issue itself sua sponte. In fact, in a recent unreported Court of Appeals case, the Court raised the issue of the absence of a necessary party even though neither the plaintiff nor defendant raised the issue.
Despite the fact that both the plaintiff and defendant were in agreement that no necessary parties were absent from the case, the Court summarily reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court after determining that there was a necessary party that was not joined in the case. In doing so, the Court stated in its unpublished order that: “Where the absence of a necessary party in the circuit court cannot be excused, this Court will ‘reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.’” Stanojevic v. Alves, Record No. 1038-23-4 (March 12, 2024) (citing Siska Tr. v. Milestone Dev., 282 Va. 169, 182, 715 S.E.2d 21, 28 (2011)).
The practitioner should take great care in deciding whether to include a party who may be considered necessary: the inclusion of that party could increase the cost of litigation, but the exclusion of that party could lead to an extended motions practice or even an ultimate declaration that the court does not have jurisdiction to render judgment.
Recent high-profile bankruptcy cases have raised a relatively new issue: manufactured jurisdiction and venue. The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “affiliate” is broad, encompassing many standard parent-subsidiary relationships. Using this broad power to affiliate, companies facing large liability issues and class action lawsuits have employed a controversial Texas business law maneuver, known formally as a “divisional merger” but more well known as the “Texas Two-Step.”
This divisional merger splits their old corporate entity in two, assigning assets to a new corporate entity that will continue on outside of bankruptcy while assigning the liability to another new corporate entity that is destined to file bankruptcy. After completing the “Texas Two-Step,” either a shell corporate entity will file for bankruptcy in the desired jurisdiction and then the liability-laden new corporate entity will associate itself with the shell entity and file in the same district or the liability-laden entity will reorganize itself in the target jurisdiction and file for bankruptcy protection.
While the main issue litigated in the “Texas Two-Step” bankruptcies has thus far been dismissal due to bad faith, the Fourth Circuit in Bestwall LLC v. Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants (In re Bestwall LLC), 71 F.4th 168 (4th Cir. 2023), addressed whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1359, which provides that district courts lack jurisdiction over civil actions “in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.” While the Bestwall majority dismissed the section 1359 arguments, the dissent found that the debtor’s use of the “Texas Two-Step” “ran afoul of the foundational principle that parties may not artificially construct a federal court’s jurisdiction—especially that of a federal bankruptcy court, which possesses particularly limited jurisdiction.” While the issue has not been well addressed, many scholars and legislators have likewise criticized the “Texas Two-Step” as a misuse of the bankruptcy system.
Defendant is charged with one count of grand larceny. The Commonwealth calls Sandra Security Officer as a witness, who testifies that on January 30, 2025, she was on duty at Department Store and arrested Defendant after she observed him selecting a suitcase, going through the store and placing a pair of jeans in the suitcase, then leaving the store without paying for the suitcase or the jeans. When asked if she is aware of the value of the suitcase and the jeans, she responds that she is because part of her job is to make sure that each item in the store has a price tag on it and she has seen the price tags for the stolen jeans and suitcase.
When the prosecutor then asks her what the prices of the jeans and suitcase are, Defense Counsel objects, arguing that the expected testimony violates the best evidence rule and the bar against hearsay.
The best evidence objection should be sustained. Price tags — as distinguished from “inscribed chattels” — are writings within the best evidence rule. Jennings v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 669 (2015).
The hearsay objection also should be sustained on these facts. Although in retail theft cases, price tags affixed to items for sale or testimony concerning the amounts on the tags are an exception to the bar against hearsay, Va. Rule 2:803(24); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 10 (1999), that exception contains a caveat that limits it to situations where there is no objection on best evidence grounds. Jennings, 65 Va. App. at 679.